Organizing global supply chains: input costs shares and vertical integration by Berlingieri, Giuseppe et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1583 
November 2018 
Organizing Global Supply Chains: Input Costs Shares and 
Vertical Integration 
Giuseppe Berlingieri 
Frank Pisch 
Claudia Steinwender 
Abstract 
We study whether and how the technological importance of an input – measured by its cost share – is 
related to the decision of whether to “make” or “buy” that input. Using detailed French international trade 
data and an instrumental variable approach based on self-constructed IO tables, we show that French 
multinationals vertically integrate those inputs that have high cost shares. A stylized incomplete 
contracting model with both ex ante and ex post inefficiencies explains why: technologically more 
important inputs are “made” when transaction cost economics type forces (TCE; favoring integration) 
overpower property rights type forces (PRT; favouring outsourcing). Additional results related to the 
contracting environment and headquarters intensity consistent with our theoretical framework show that 
both TCE and PRT type forces are needed to fully explain the empirical patterns in the data. 
Key words: vertical integration, supply chains, direct requirements, input output relationship, intrafirm 
trade 
JEL Codes: F10; F14; L16; L23; O14 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Trade Programme.  The Centre for Economic Performance 
is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We thank Laura Alfaro, Pol Antràs, Davin Chor, Bob Gibbons, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Veronica 
Rappoport, Armando Rungi, Catherine Thomas, and John Van Reenen for their helpful comments. We are 
especially grateful to Paola Conconi and Peter Egger (Pisch’s PhD committee), and for discussions at the 
CEPR Conference on GVCs; NUS Conference on Global Production; CEP Conference; SETC; and 
presentations at Harvard, MIT, ESSEC, Groningen and St. Gallen. We thank Corcos et al. (2013) and 
Keiko Ito for sharing data, Jonathan Colmer for code, and Hanwei Huang for help with Chinese data. 
Access to French data benefited from the use of the Centre d’accès sécurisé aux donnes (CASD), part of 
the “Investissements dAvenir” programme (reference: ANR-10-EQPX-17) and supported by a public grant 
overseen by the French National Research Agency (ANR). Berlingieri acknowledges support by the 
ESSEC Research Centre and Pisch by the Dr. Heinrich Wachter Foundation. 
Giuseppe Berlingieri, ESSEC Business School and Centre for Economic Performance, London 
School of Economics. Frank Pisch, University of St. Gallen, SIAW and Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics. Claudia Steinwender, MIT Sloan, NBER, CEPR and Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 
issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor 
at the above address. 
 G. Berlingieri, F. Pisch and C. Steinwender, submitted 2018. 
1 Introduction
Multinational firms manage global supply networks with hundreds, sometimes thou-
sands of intermediate inputs. In this paper we study whether and how the technological
importance of an input – measured by its cost share – is related to the decision of whether
to “make” or “buy” that input, i.e., to directly control production or not. Using detailed
French trade data, we compare different products sourced by the same firm and show
that inputs with a higher cost share are more likely to be sourced from affiliated parties.
Since firm level cost shares are endogenous to organizational choice, we use variation
across upstream inputs at the highly disaggregated downstream industry level obtained
from detailed self-constructed IO tables from France and other countries as instrumental
variables for firm specific cost shares. Our identification assumption is that these indus-
try level cost shares capture fundamental – and thus exogenous to the organizational
choice – technological relationships between inputs and outputs.
To fix ideas, imagine a car factory. A modern automobile consists of about 500 com-
ponents, made of around 30,000 individual pieces, which are delivered to a factory and
then combined.1 A unifying feature that is relevant for each and every single item is
its contribution to the output product made by a firm. On the component level, for
example, an engine contributes significantly more to the costs of a car than a rear view
mirror – regardless of the make or model of the car. Conceptually, in an input-output
framework, a dollar’s worth of a car produced relies much more on the contribution of
an engine producer than a rear view mirror supplier. In other words, some inputs are
technologically more important than others.2 Anecdotal evidence suggests that engines
are typically produced in-house, while rear view mirrors are outsourced. This is con-
sistent with our main finding: high cost share (i.e., “important”) inputs are significantly
more likely to be sourced intrafirm. This novel result carries a causal interpretation due
to our identification strategy: Building IO coefficients from micro data allows us to ad-
dress potential concerns about the exclusion restriction and to achieve the very fine level
of disaggregation needed to analyze sourcing decisions.
The role of technological importance is economically significant: An input at the 75th
percentile of the cost share distribution is about 7 percentage points more likely to be
1The Wikipedia list of “auto parts” contains a rough enumeration of the different components of an
automobile and has around 500 entries. When internationally sourced, these components relate to about
200 different HS 10 digit codes in 10 different chapters of the HS classification (Klier and Rubinstein, 2010).
2We use the technological elasticity of output quantity/quality with respect to input quantity/quality
as our parameter of technological importance in the theoretical framework below. Acemoglu et al. (2010)
by contrast analyze investment intensity into RnD upstream and downstream as a “technological” deter-
minant.
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sourced in-house than one at the 25th percentile, which amounts to about one quarter of
the baseline share of integration. We document that cost shares are at least as important
in driving make-or-buy decisions of multinationals as previously studied determinants
such as capital intensity, skill intensity, or productivity.
We next explore the economic mechanisms that can explain this pattern. The lit-
erature on multinational firms typically relies on the property rights framework (PRT)
developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to conceptualize
firm boundaries.3 An alternative approach, called the transaction cost economics theory
of the firm (TCE) and pioneered by Williamson (1985) and Klein et al. (1978), emphasizes
ex post contracting problems between suppliers and their customers.4 We use these two
(sets of) influential ideas as the lens to interpret our main finding.5 We build a stylized
framework in which contracts are incomplete ex ante and ex post, so that both PRT and
TCE type mechanisms operate. We show that these two forces typically have opposite
predictions for the integration of technologically important inputs: A downstream firm
faces stronger incentives to outsource the production of more important inputs to in-
dependent suppliers, because it wants to limit underinvestment for these crucial inputs
(PRT type force). By contrast, suppliers of more important inputs cause greater ineffi-
ciencies through haggling or mis-coordination, which the downstream firm tries to curb
by bringing the supplier under its control (TCE type force). Our main empirical findings
are consistent with a world in which TCE forces are on average stronger than PRT forces.
To understand whether PRT forces are just weak on average or completely absent
and thus, whether both ex ante and ex post inefficiencies are present in the data, we
derive additional predictions from our model that hold only when PRT forces are also
at work. Specifically, we extend our model to show that when a supply relationship
is subject to a better contracting environment ex ante, or when the buyer’s investment
into a relationship is more significant, technological importance makes intrafirm trade
even more likely; in other words, our main result is reinforced. Intuitively, when ex
ante investments are more contractible, or when the downstream firm has an important
investment to make, the incentives for the downstream firm to outsource are generally
weaker as underinvestment upstream is less severe. Since underinvestment matters more
for technologically more important inputs, they are (even) more likely to be ‘made’ rather
3Early contributions include Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), and Grossman et al. (2006).
4Prominent applications of TCE type mechanisms in the study of multinational firms are Costinot et
al. (2011) and Alfaro et al. (2016).
5The industrial organization literature has explored other, market based explanations for vertical inte-
gration, such as foreclosure or double marginalization. For applications to multinational firms see Boehm
and Sonntag (2018) and Garetto (2013).
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than ‘bought’.
In the final part of this paper, we provide robust empirical evidence related to the
contracting environment and headquarters intensity that are in line with these predic-
tions. Therefore, both TCE and PRT type forces are needed to fully explain the empirical
relationship between technological importance and vertical integration observed in the
data. Our conceptual approach as well as the empirical evidence we present in this
article are — to the best of our knowledge — novel in the field of research into multina-
tional firm behavior.6 This paper therefore underlines the usefulness of an “integrative
framework” as predicted in Gibbons (2005).7
The findings in this paper are relevant for both researchers and policy makers. A dis-
tinguishing feature of today’s global economy is the ubiquity of so called “global value
chains” (GVCs), i.e., production processes that are “sliced up” and distributed across
a large number of countries around the world. The extent of the global fragmentation
of production chains can be assessed by looking at the share of intermediate inputs
that are internationally traded, which reached around 60-70% of total trade in 1995-2007
(Miroudot et al., 2009). The key players that coordinate and control these global supply
chains are multinational enterprises: They account for the vast majority of international
transactions in goods (Bernard et al. 2009) and between 30 and 50% of all these goods
change hands within their boundaries (Ruhl, 2015). We show that these multinationals
internalize activities that have high technological significance and that they do so to im-
prove coordinated adaptation and avoid rent sharing, even if vertical integration creates
weak investment incentives.
The existing literature has examined various aspects of GVCs that shape intrafirm
sourcing decisions. Among these are location or country level characteristics8 and the
technological features of how individual products are developed, produced, and dis-
6Input-output coefficients have featured in empirical work on vertical integration elsewhere: Acemoglu
et al. (2010) use direct requirements as measures for relative importance of overall upstream to downstream
investment and show that they amplify the effect of RnD intensity on vertical integration. Our focus is
different since we examine a given firm and explore how inputs with different cost shares relative to
each other are typically sourced. Alfaro et al. (forthcoming) use total requirements as a control in their
empirical approach, while we focus on direct requirements in this paper. Finally, Alfaro et al. (2018) find
that direct requirements are positively correlated with upstream ownership and note that this is consistent
with their delegation model, while we focus on intrafirm trade and how it can be explained with property
rights and/or transaction cost economics models.
7Other examples of rich explanations for observed firm boundaries include Baker and Hubbard (2003)
and, more recently, Kalnins et al. (2018).
8Examples are the level of (intellectual) property rights protection, judicial quality, or the state of the
financial system (e.g., Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2009; Macchiavello, 2012; Carluccio
and Fally, 2012; Eppinger and Kukharskyy, 2017), as well as the tax system (e.g., Flaaen, 2017), trade policy
(e.g., Ornelas and Turner, 2011; Diez, 2014; Alfaro et al., 2016), and geography (e.g., Antras and Helpman,
2004; Irarrazabal et al., 2013).
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tributed9. Only recently, however, have technological characteristics of different supply
chains or networks been researched. Antras and Chor (2013), Alfaro et al. (forthcoming),
and Del Prete and Rungi (2017) explore whether multinationals produce in early or late
stages of their (purely sequential) supply chains and conclude that they are typically ac-
tive in activities close to their core business.10 In this paper we focus on directly sourced
inputs (as opposed to inputs of suppliers, and inputs of suppliers of suppliers, etc.), and
explore which of them are integrated.
Furthermore, we shed new light on the anatomy of intrafirm trade. In particular,
we draw attention to and explain the fact that there is not only a skewed distribution
of intrafirm sourcing across firms (cf. Atalay et al., 2014; Ramondo et al., 2016), but also
within, and this can be explained by sufficiently detailed cost shares: Multinationals
produce only the technologically most significant inputs in-house. Moreover, we com-
plement the findings of Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who show that a large share of FDI
is undertaken in vertical supply relationships. According to our findings, such vertical
FDI is much more likely to occur along technologically important supply relationships.
We first outline our empirical strategy, data, and main results in Section 2, where we
also present a number of robustness checks and our horse race exercise. In Section 3 we
introduce our stylized conceptual framework, use it to discuss our main finding, and
derive additional implications. We test these predictions in Section 4 and conclude with
Section 5.
2 Baseline Empirical Results
In this section we outline our empirical strategy, introduce the data, explain the instru-
mental variables used, and discuss our main empirical finding.
2.1 Empirical Strategy
Since we want to compare the integration decision of different inputs within a firm, our
main regressor varies at the firm by input level. These inputs are classified according to
9For example, the degree to which both parties of a transaction contribute to it marginally (see, for
example, Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Hart and Moore, 1990; Whinston, 2001), whether alternative
trading partners are available in case of a break up (e.g., Joskow, 1985; Monteverde and Teece, 1982), and
the ease with which comprehensive contracts can be written and enforced (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2007). For
review articles, see Lafontaine and Slade (2007), Bresnahan and Levin (2012), and Legros and Newman
(2014).
10Recently, Fattorini et al. (2017) explore network centrality in the IO network, while Bolatto et al. (2017)
investigate the role of intangible assets in sequential supply chains.
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HS 4 digit (roughly 1100 product categories).
For a given input p we relate the share of imports that a firm i operating in indus-
try j acquires from its (international) related parties in overall imports of that input
from country c, intrashareijpc, to this input’s cost share across all intermediate inputs,
costshareip.11,12 The baseline structural equation we estimate is
intrashareijpc = β1 costshareip + αi + γcj + φcp + εijpc. (1)
The various fixed effects αi, γcj, and φcp ensure that we do not mistake any other down-
stream firm, country × industry, or country × input specific characteristics that in-
crease the likelihood of intrafirm sourcing for the effect of the importance of inputs
in a firm’s production function. For example, we account for headquarters intensity
of the downstream firm in the downstream-firm i specific fixed effects. Similarly, the
relationship-specificity of a particular input, or the codifiability of tasks required for the
production of a certain input, are captured by country × product fixed effects. These
intercepts also absorb country specific gravity factors that influence the patterns of FDI,
like distance, market size, multilateral resistance etc.; and since we make the country
effects downstream industry and upstream product specific, we absorb variation related
to comparative advantage. Moreover, origin country × downstream industry cj fixed
effects exclude variation that stems from the interaction between financial development
of the origin country and financial constraints.13 Finally, another purpose of using origin
country by input cp fixed effects is to clean our estimates of country specific input price
related factors that may drive integration decisions.14
Despite the rich set of fixed effects, we are still concerned that input cost shares are
endogenous to the integration decision. First, firms may substitute towards inputs pro-
duced by their foreign affiliates (i.e., reverse causality), for example to trigger increasing
11We have checked that the results are robust to using various other dependent variables. In par-
ticular, we define three binary variables. First, we define an integrated (as opposed to outsourced)
flow as intrashareijpc ≥ 0.5. Second, we follow Corcos et al. (2013) in that a flow is within firm iff
intrashareijpc ≥ 0.8 and outside iff intrashareijpc ≤ 0.2. Finally, we count as fully integrated only obser-
vations that have intrashareijpc = 1, while observations with intrashareijpc = 0 count as outsourced. We
find very similar results with all these dummy variables, which is due to the fact that few products at
our highly disaggregated level are sourced with a mix of outsourcing and integration. This is in itself an
interesting feature of the data: make-AND-buy strategies appear to be more prevalent at the firm, rather
than at the product level in the cross section, see Loertscher and Riordan (forthcoming) for a theoretical
treatment of make-and-buy.
12In our context the share of intrafirm trade is the correct dependent variable, because our theoretical
mechanism operates at the finest input level and hence predicts organizational mix at any more aggregate
level, such as the HS 4 digit level.
13See Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Eppinger and Kukharskyy (2017).
14See Alfaro et al. (2016).
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returns for them and maximize global profits, or because information frictions are less
severe. Second, multinational firms frequently engage in transfer pricing, which distorts
input cost shares selectively in integrated relationships.15 In our setting, firms might in-
tegrate to avoid paying higher prices due to “double marginalization” in the presence of
market power in the upstream markets;16 conversely, firms in relatively high tax France
may charge inflated prices for inputs produced by foreign affiliates in order to artificially
reduce their taxable income.17 Alternatively, transfer pricing is a way of alleviating the
burden of tariffs. Third, it is possible that the values recorded in our data do not reflect
the economic cost structures of our firms, because inventories may fluctuate significantly
as a consequence of demand or supply shocks, and — as we estimate our regressions in
a single cross section — inventory states distort input cost shares. Moreover, (interna-
tional) trade has been shown to be lumpy due to fixed costs of ordering.18 Consequently,
the cost shares we calculate from international trade data are subject to variation due to
shipments arriving early or late with respect to a given accounting year. Finally, cost
shares reflect technological input-output relationships only to some extent and depend
on many other characteristics that may contribute to measurement error when using
input cost shares as proxies for technological importance.19
To address these challenges, we employ an instrumental variable strategy. In partic-
ular, we use information from self-constructed, detailed IO tables that capture variation
in industry level input cost shares to instrument for the firm level cost shares. The ba-
sic identification assumption is that industry-level IO relationships affect organizational
choice only through their effects on input cost shares. This assumption is likely to hold
since IO tables capture broad features of the underlying production technology and are,
in particular, not likely to be affected by individual firms in a large economy like France.
In section 2.3 we perform several robustness checks and modifications of our instrument
to make sure the endogeneity problems at the firm level are not just pushed up to the
more aggregate industry level.
We estimate equation (1) with two stage least squares (2SLS) and allow the error
term to be correlated across all observations that belong to the same broad downstream
15There is a substantial body of research that explores the nature and consequences of transfer pricing.
For recent examples see Davies et al. (2018), Flaaen (2017), and the citations therein.
16See Garetto (2013).
17Bernard et al. (2006) find that U.S. multinationals charge on average significantly lower export prices
for intrafirm transactions. The average arm’s length price is 43 percent higher than the price for intrafirm
transactions.
18See Alessandria et al. (2010).
19For example, a mechanical reason to find a significant relationship is the fact that the intrashare and
cost share variables share components in their denominators, we will discuss this further below.
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industry and across all observations that belong to the same broad upstream industry –
either dimension creates about 50 clusters and is significantly more aggregate than our
IV.
2.2 Data Sets and Summary Statistics
First, we use the Enquete Echanges Internationaux Intragroupe (EIIG), a single cross sec-
tion in 1999, to obtain information about intrafirm trade of French firms.20 The targeted
survey population included every French firm whose annual trade volume is at least
one million Euros and who is owned by a manufacturing group that controls at least
50% of a foreign firm. Out of this target population (8,236 businesses) roughly half of all
firms responded. These 4,305 firms account for about 80% of French trade conducted by
French multinational entities.
Corcos et al. (2013) point to the fact that the EIIG survey suffered from non-response.
They also show that this poses a significant problem in their context since their results
change meaningfully when they apply a selection correction. Because we use within
firm variation, their selection correction variable is absorbed by firm fixed effects in our
specification. In the horse race exercise further below, where we drop the firm specific
intercepts, we apply their selection correction.
For each responding firm, the EIIG has information about the value share of imports
from related parties for each HS 4 digit product that the firm imports, by country of
origin. In our final sample we focus on imports by the EIIG manufacturing firms (ISIC
Rev. 3 codes 15 to 37).21
We supplement these trade data with the Enquete Annuelle d’Entreprise (EAE),
which provides us with balance sheet data on all French firms with more than 20 employ-
ees and a random sample of smaller firms. We use these data to obtain total expenditure
on intermediate inputs.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the firms in our data. There are about 3,000
firms in the final sample. The first row reports the average import share from affiliated
parties across all firms in the sample: The average firm in our sample carries out 27% of
its transactions inside the boundary of the firm (across products and origins). However,
the distribution of intrafirm trade is rather skewed towards a few, large companies re-
porting a larger share of intrafirm transactions: The median firm imports only 9% of its
20Other work that uses this data set includes Carluccio and Fally (2012), Corcos et al. (2013), Defever
and Toubal (2013), and Carluccio and Bas (2015).
21The EIIG survey data was amended with official international trade data. This is described in the
official documentation and our results are robust to excluding the affected flows.
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transactions from affiliated parties.22 Moreover, it can be seen that the typical firm will
contribute to our estimates since it sources a substantial number of different inputs from
abroad. Finally, consistent with the target population of the EIIG, our firms are relatively
large.
Our main regressor is the intermediate input cost share of an input to capture its
technological importance. In our setting, more important inputs are those which a firm
spends more on. We calculate costshareip as
costshareip =
∑c importsipc
totcosti
,
where importsipc is the total value of all imports by firm i of input p from country c and
totcosti is total expenditure on intermediate goods by firm i taken from the EAE. Figure
B.1 in Appendix B.3 shows the empirical density of the input cost shares at the firm ×
input level.
It is important to note that our cost shares are based only on internationally sourced
inputs; we do not have data on domestically sourced inputs. However, we use several
different normalizations for our input cost share that take different import propensities
of firms into account. In particular, we find that our results are robust to using either
spending on foreign sourced inputs or total costs (labor costs plus intermediate spend-
ing) instead of total intermediate costs in the calculation of the input cost shares.
2.3 Instrument: Input-Output Tables
Our main instrument for the input cost shares is based on a self-constructed French IO
table. In order to achieve a strong first stage we need relatively disaggregated informa-
tion, and in order to ascertain exogeneity we need to remove our EIIG firms’ trade flows
from the IO data.
In principle, IO tables are readily available for most countries and France is no ex-
ception. However, the most commonly used, official 2 digit ISIC Rev. 3 domestic French
table for the year 1999 satisfies neither of our requirements.23 This IO table captures
mostly domestic transactions and, together with a high level of aggregation, yields a
22A similar skewness has also been reported for the U.S. Ramondo et al. (2016).
23For the purpose of this paper, “domestic” refers to an IO table that contains domestic transactions
alongside international trade, which is the standard IO table most researchers use, and we call it “domes-
tic” in order to differentiate it from those tables that contain only import trade flows.
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first stage that is too weak for identification purposes. Unfortunately, there are no offi-
cially published disaggregated tables available for France (unlike for the U.S.).
We therefore construct our own IO tables for the year 1999 from transaction level
import data for the whole of France.24 To obtain 4 digit NAF 1993 industry codes25
for all trading firms we rely on the FICUS database, which contains balance sheet and
administrative information for the near universe of French enterprises. The customs data
are matched to this firm information with a success rate of 91%. We use balance sheet
information to compute gross output by NAF industry and calculate the import direct
requirements at the NAF industry × HS 4 digit input level.26
To illustrate our approach, imagine the following example. Car manufacturers in
France, PSA and Renault, import chassis of value EUR 1 (PSA) and EUR 2 (Renault)
and engines of value EUR 2 (PSA) and EUR 3 (Renault). To construct our IO tables we
link all import transactions of chassis and engines (classified according to HS 4 digit) to
their respective importers. Summing all transactions across all firms in the downstream
industry (cars) gives us the total value imported of each HS 4 digit input by the down-
stream industry. In our example, value(chassis → cars) = EUR 3 and value(engines →
cars) = EUR 5. Now we can use French firm level data to find the gross output for both
firms, EUR 40 (PSA) and EUR 50 (Renault). We can add these up to get gross output at
the industry level, namely EUR 90. To get our import IO direct requirements, we divide
the transacted volume by gross output, i.e. dr(chassis→ cars) = 3/90 and dr(engines→
cars) = 5/90.
These tables are constructed directly from micro data and therefore we name them
“micro” tables. Moreover, since the upstream (product) dimension is classified at the HS
4 digit level and the downstream (industry) dimension follows the much coarser NAF
classification, we call these tables “asymmetric” in the sense that one dimension of the
matrix is much longer than the other.27
We perform two additional modifications to improve our instrument further. First,
when computing the industry level intermediate costs, we leave out a firm’s own trade
flows, effectively creating firm specific IO tables.28 Second, we compute the IO table for
24We plan to make our French import IO tables available on our websites for the future use of re-
searchers. Feenstra and Jensen (2012) follow a similar strategy for the U.S.
25NAF is the French industry classification and more disaggregated than ISIC or NACE.
26The components we use for gross output are detailed in Appendix B.1.1.
27Note that in the language of IO tables, we have constructed a USE table, which is not a ‘proper’ IO
table in the inverse Leontief sense, but the meaningful table for the purpose of our estimation. We simplify
the exposition here by referring to our tables as “IO tables” and their elements as “direct requirements”,
acknowledging the fact that this is technically speaking imprecise.
28For further robustness, we also removed trade flows of all our EIIG firms from our international trade
data when we constructed the import IO table. Our main results are unchanged when we use this IO
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1996, three years prior to the date of the regressor: to the extent that import IO tables
capture mostly the underlying technological substitution patterns across inputs (and
hence their technological importance), the 1996 direct requirements are good predictors
of 1999 input cost shares, while arguably being less suspicious of reverse causality or
other problems.
Figure 1, where we present a contour plot of several IO tables, illustrates why our
self-constructed direct requirements are powerful allies. The upper left graph is well
known: in the 2 digit level official table, by far most of the transaction volume takes
place on the main diagonal, while only few, usually proximate sectors are connected off
the main diagonal. When we construct our micro IO table at the 2 digit level, this pattern
is replicated quite well – an observation we interpret as validation for our approach. As
expected, we do find a few differences between the upper two tables, which relate to
the fact that in contrast to the official IO table we do not need to make any strong
assumption regarding tradability and can simply let the actual trade transactions speak.
Furthermore, we focus on external trade only, which improves our first stage below.
Constructing the tables at a more disaggregated level has two effects. First, the diag-
onal becomes relatively “thinner”. Second, the elements off the diagonal exhibit more
“contrast”. In other words, the cells in the lower two plots in Figure 1 have clear bor-
ders now and stand out properly from the background. Econometrically, we reduce
measurement error and bring the relevant variation to the fore.
The asymmetric IO table at the finest level of disaggregation – our preferred level –
exhibits a soft “diagonal”, which stems from the fact that product and industry classi-
fications follow a similar ordering. Industry codes are usually assigned on the basis of
the product they produce (and vice versa).
The actual instrument we use below is not the direct requirement itself, but a cat-
egorical variable that indicates quantiles of the direct requirement distribution. Figure
2 shows the empirical density of our self-constructed import requirements. It is very
skewed to the left and even the median is relatively small, because we normalize by
gross output. The vertical lines indicate quintiles and our preferred instrument is a
variable that takes the value 5 whenever the direct requirement of downstream indus-
try j with respect to upstream input p falls into segment V, value 4 if it falls into IV,
table, including a sufficiently strong first stage. Moreover, we obtain the same result when we retain all
EIIG flows in the data when we construct our IO tables.
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and so on. In this way we semi-parametrically capture the skewed distribution of the
requirements and make the instrument more robust to measurement error.29
We argued above that our self-constructed IO table solves the problem of cost shares
being endogenous to a firm’s integration decision provided the identification assumption
is satisfied. One may, however, be concerned that forces that operate in partial or general
equilibrium render the exclusion restriction violated despite our efforts. To address this
concern, we make use of two other IO tables where such effects are very unlikely to play
a first order role. First, we apply the same methodology as above to construct direct
import requirements from Chinese micro data. For the year 2006 we have access to the
universe of import transactions in goods and can link these to the involved Chinese
importer.30 To identify the industry of the buyer, we link the trade data to the Chinese
Annual Industrial Survey (CAIS) which covers all State Owned Firms (SOE) and non-
SOEs with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan. From this data source we obtain the
CIC code for every importer and compute gross output at CIC level. Using a crosswalk,
we finally concord the CIC downstream industry to ISIC Rev. 3.31 While this Chinese
table, like our French micro table, also has the advantage of being very detailed, it uses
variation that is less relevant for France, since the two countries occupy different parts
of global value chains and rely on different comparative advantages.
Second, as an alternative we use the 2002 U.S. benchmark USE table, which captures
a sourcing behavior much more similar to the one exhibited by French firms. However,
we do not have access to the U.S. micro data, and the officially available table is more
aggregate than our French one, since the inputs are aggregated to the industry level
(U.S. IO classification). Furthermore, in order to utilize this table, we had to establish a
crosswalk to ISIC Rev. 3. Unfortunately a concordance directly to NAF was not feasible,
and this introduces measurement error. As a result, estimates using the U.S. instrument
should be interpreted with these caveats in mind.
One might argue that the organizational choice of a firm itself affects the market
structure in the upstream industry, which may result in reverse causality at the industry
29Our main results are fully robust to using other functional forms, for example the direct requirements
themselves.
30Chinese trade has undergone an historically unprecedented growth spurt in the years following its
accession to the WTO in late 2001, which was pronounced at the extensive product margin. In order to
capture this variation and therefore limit the number of missings and measurement error in the IO table,
we have chosen a late year in the data available to us.
31We note that the need for concording puts a limit on the level of downstream disaggregation, since
ISIC Rev. 3 contains significantly fewer codes at the lowest level than the French NAF classification.
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level, after all. While we cannot fully rule out this possibility, we think that the fact that
we get very similar results using IO tables from three very different countries makes
this alternative explanation for our findings relatively unlikely: The effect of a firm’s
sourcing decision on the upstream industry would have to be reflected in the IO tables
of all three countries.
2.4 Main Results
The main result of this paper is documented in Table 2. In column (1) we present the
unconditional correlation between cost shares and the intrafirm share. In column (2)
we add our baseline fixed effects as detailed in equation (1). Finally, columns (3) to (5)
report the 2SLS estimates using our preferred asymmetric French table, the asymmetric
Chinese table, and the U.S. benchmark table, respectively.32,33 The first stage Kleibergen-
Paap (KP) statistics are large, so that we are confident about the relevance of all three
instruments. As expected given our discussion above, the Chinese and U.S. tables are
weaker predictors of French firms’ cost shares than the French table. Most importantly,
however, our coefficient of interest, β1, is always estimated to be positive and highly
significant. The IV results are significantly larger than the OLS estimates, which is in
line with an attenuation bias due to measurement error or a negative bias due to the in-
centives of firms to integrate more in the presence of tariffs or to avoid double marginal-
ization, which would imply lower cost shares in case of integration (see, for instance,
Bernard et al., 2006).
According to our preferred estimate in column (3), an input at the median of the
input cost share distribution is about 0.0013 ∗ 12.137 ≈ 1.6 percentage points more likely
to be integrated than a wholly insignificant input, over a baseline integration probability
of 28 percent. The interquartile difference is about 7 percentage points, which amounts
to one quarter of the baseline integration probability. These magnitudes are also robust
to using variation from Chinese or U.S. sourcing behavior to identify β1.34
We next explore how robust these results are to various concerns and report our
findings in Table 3, using our preferred instrument, the asymmetric, lagged French micro
32The first stage regressions are reported in Appendix B.3, Table B.2.
33The number of observations falls from column (1) to (2)-(5) since we exclude singletons. The sample
used for Table 2 is conditional on non-missing values for all three instruments.
34We also estimate the baseline specification with Logit IV, rather than the linear probability model, to
take into account that our dependent variable is largely a binary variable. The results are robust.
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IO table.35
Since we are concerned with vertical integration in this paper, i.e., the mode of or-
ganization for the procurement of inputs, we want to make sure that our results are
not driven by horizontal transactions, i.e., sourcing of essentially finished items.36 As
an example, a French car manufacturer may assemble a specific model in France, but
have foreign production sites in which it assembles other models. If it imports some
other models and resells them in France, they will look like inputs in our data that are
sourced from affiliates. However, since the car manufacturer resells them, this is hori-
zontal, rather than vertical integration, which we are not interested in. In order to make
sure not to capture horizontal integration, we drop all observations in which the down-
stream importer i is mainly active in the industry j that also produces the good sourced
(p). In IO terminology, this means we drop all observations on the IO diagonal. Since
our asymmetric table does not have a well defined diagonal, we exclude all observations
on the 4 digit ISIC Rev. 3 diagonal. This strategy is conservative in that we do not use
the full detail available to us from our micro data and drop many transactions that are
in fact purely vertical.
The result for this robustness check is reported in column (1), where the number of
observations shrinks by about one third compared to the full sample that is available for
our empirical strategy. Even though the KP statistic falls, it is still sufficiently high to
take the estimates seriously. Importantly, the point estimate is not significantly different
from our baseline result, so that we can conclude that our results are not driven by the
high cost shares for horizontally traded products.37
A further potential concern relates to our instrument. If the multinationals in our
EIIG sample play a dominant role in their respective industries, excluding their own
trade flows may not be enough for our purpose. In column (2) of table 3 we estimate our
baseline specification on the sample of firms in highly competitive industries, i.e. those
where the Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index in 1999 was below 0.1.38 We retain a sizable part
of our sample and the cost share coefficient remains virtually unchanged compared to
35The number of observations varies across columns due to our restricting the sample (columns (1) and
(2)) and different sets of singletons (columns (3) to (6)). The number of observations can be higher than
in Table 2, since we only condition on the French direct requirement being non-missing, rather than all IO
tables.
36These could be intermediates that are sold on to other firms or final goods that are sold on to con-
sumers.
37In appendix Table B.1 we report the specifications from the full baseline Table 2 when we drop the
diagonal transactions.
38We compute these indices from the near universe of French firms in FICUS at the NAF 4 digit level.
The result is robust to using other thresholds around 0.1, but the latter is often referred to as a reference
point for antitrust considerations.
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the baseline. We interpret this finding as further support for our identification strategy.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 we show that our results are not driven by technical
similarity, which may be positively correlated with cost shares. Imagine a producer of
foodstuffs (ISIC Rev. 3 code 1549) and a pharmaceutical company (ISIC Rev. 3 code 2423)
that source coffee beans (HS code 0901) and formaldehyde (HS code 2912). It should not
come as a big surprise that the pharmaceutical company does not buy coffee for its em-
ployees (a low cost share input) from its own roastery in Nicaragua and that a foodstuffs
company typically refrains from integrating its supplier of machine disinfectant (again
a low cost share input). The reason is that firms may be more likely to ‘make’ inputs
that are technically similar to its current production in order to exploit, for example,
economies of scale in production or RnD.39
To check that our results are not driven by technical similarity, we show in two dif-
ferent ways that they also hold within technically similar inputs. We first include 4 digit
ISIC Rev. 3 downstream industry × HS 4 digit upstream product fixed effects, meaning
that we only use variation coming from comparing the same input across very similar
downstream firms.40 To use the example above, we compare different producers of in-
gredients for beverages and examine whether a company for which coffee beans are a
more important input is also more likely to source them from its own roastery. Next,
we replace the specific intercepts with downstream firm × upstream 4 digit ISIC Rev.
3 industry fixed effects, effectively comparing two very similar inputs sourced by the
same firm – a pharmaceutical company sourcing formaldehyde and formic acid (HS
code 2915), for example. The point estimates fall, but remain significant and large, even
when we identify β1 off very little variation.
We would like to point out that the robustness checks with interacted upstream ×
downstream fixed effects serve two additional purposes. When we focus on a particu-
lar supply relationship between two industries, we hold their relative upstreamness, i.e.,
their relative distance to each other in the value chain, constant. For example, when
comparing different inputs sourced by a firm and produced by the same, highly disag-
gregated upstream industry (column 4 in Table 3), then these inputs all have the same
“distance” in the value chain from the downstream firm. Equally, comparing the same
input sourced by different firms in the same downstream industry (column 3 in Table 3),
the latter have a very similar “distance” from the upstream product.
The first implication of the fact that our results are still statistically and economically
39Empirical evidence on a potential role of technical similarity for horizontal integration is provided by
Boehm et al. (2017).
40Our instrument varies at the 4 digit NAF level, which is significantly more disaggregated than 4 digit
ISIC Rev. 3.
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significant is that our finding is not driven by relative upstreamness. Antras and Chor
(2013) and Alfaro et al. (forthcoming) show that firms typically integrate the most prox-
imate stages of production relative to their own position in the supply chain. Since our
cost shares may be positively correlated with relative downstreamness, this mechanism
could potentially account for our finding. The exercises in columns (3) and (4) in Table 3
show, however, that even when relative upstreamness is kept constant, our main finding
persists. This is reassuring for technological importance as a separate determinant of
integration decisions in supply networks.
More conceptually, with our fixed effect regressions, we zoom in on integration de-
cisions across the legs of a spider, i.e., into parallel segments of supply chains (Baldwin
and Venables, 2013). Previous research has shown that more relatively downstream pro-
duction stages are integrated on average, and we show that within those (i.e., directly
sourced) inputs, the more important ones are integrated.
Finally, our results may still be biased by transfer pricing considerations, since cost
shares rely on input prices and the potential for within firm adjustments for tax purposes
clearly increases with the degree of vertical integration. Even when we rely on our IO
tables as a source of exogenous variation, these may still reflect transfer pricing motives
at the industry level.
To address this concern, we implement two robustness checks. First, we include
firm × origin country fixed effects in our baseline specification and therefore compare
only inputs that a firm sources from the same country. Since incentives to transfer price
mainly depend on the tax regime in the origin country (relative to France), we abstract
from the main portion of worrisome variation in our data. The estimate reported in
column (5) shows that our results are robust.
Second, another important reason to adjust prices for internally traded inputs is the
fact that tariff payments can be lowered. If this concern plays a role in our data, we
should find that the effect of input cost shares varies systematically with import tariffs
imposed by the EU. We obtain data on applied MFN and preferential ad valorem rates
from the TRAINS data base and interact the cost shares with a dummy that equals one
whenever a tariff is above the median in the country × product distribution.41 Instru-
menting this interaction term with our IO table interacted with the same tariff variable
(in addition to our baseline instrumentation), we show that there is no problematic sys-
tematic heterogeneity in the effect of cost shares.
41Aggregation from the reported HS 6 digit to the HS 4 digit level is done by weighting with French ex-
port values in 1996. We use the maximum rate within an HS 6 digit code to make our test as demanding as
possible, but our finding holds equally with the simple average and the minimum rate. Our result is robust
to interacting with the standard measure in the literature, namely log tari f f = log(1+ max rate/100).
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As a final exercise we want to develop an understanding as to how significant a driver
technological importance is for the make-or-buy decision relative to other determinants. To
do so we compare the magnitude of the cost share effect to those of firm level character-
istics that have been shown to correlate strongly with vertical integration. In particular,
we include (physical and intangible) capital intensity, skill intensity, and productivity
estimates following Corcos et al. (2013), who use very similar data.42, 43
To be able to include determinants that vary at the firm level in the regression, we
need to drop the firm fixed effects. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the EIIG survey
suffered from selected non-response, which can bias estimates in across firm regressions.
We therefore follow Corcos et al. (2013) and apply a Heckman procedure to address
this potential bias.44 We report standardized coefficients throughout to enable direct
comparisons. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that dropping firm fixed effects and applying
the Heckman selection does not affect the statistical significance of our estimated effect
for input cost shares. In columns (2) to (6) we add the integration determinants that the
previous literature has studied one by one.
An input with a cost share that is one standard deviation (SD) higher than the cost
share of another input is roughly four fifths of a SD more likely to be sourced from an
affiliate. This effect is of a similar order of magnitude across all columns, but larger than
those of all other determinants in our horse race, such as skill intensity or productivity
— even when we add them all together in column (6).45 The interquartile effect of
cost shares (column (1)) in this sample is 6.5 %, which compares, for example, to 2.7%
for intangible capital intensity, 5.5% for skill intensity, and 4.9% for value added per
worker. With the caveat that we do not attempt to causally identify the other firm level
determinants – which would be well beyond the scope of this article, and which none
of the previous literature has attempted to do, either – we conclude that cost shares are
quantitatively as powerful in shifting vertical integration patterns as other characteristics
examined in the literature.
42The construction of all variables is detailed in Appendix B.1.1.
43In unreported regressions, we investigate the effects of other determinants at the product (contractibil-
ity) and country level (institutional quality) as in Corcos et al. (2013). We find similarly convincing results
with input shares being significant throughout and with an effect of similar, if not larger, magnitude
compared to the other determinants.
44Corcos et al. (2013) estimate inverse Mill’s (IM) ratios for survey non-response and add a random
sample of large non-multinational importers. We obtain a larger sample than provided by the EIIG and
than the one used in Corcos et al. (2013), who aggregate inputs at the coarser CPA level. All further details
can be found in appendix B.1.2.
45Value added is collinear with capital and skill intensity and hence omitted in the final column.
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3 Theoretical Framework
Having presented the main contribution of this paper, we want to explore the mech-
anisms behind our findings. The two most successful conceptual frameworks in the
literature on multinational firms are the property rights theory (focusing on ex ante in-
efficiencies) and transaction cost economics (focusing on ex post inefficiencies). In this
section we interpret our main result in light of these two influential theories using a
stylized model that features incomplete contracts both ex ante and ex post.
We want to stress that we do not attempt to test different models of the boundary of
the firm against each other, which is extremely difficult (see Whinston, 2001). Instead, we
aim to provide an extension of the PRT workhorse model of multinational firm behavior
that incorporates TCE type features, and use it to create a deeper understanding of the
two forces and their interaction with other variables.46 We derive additional testable
predictions and, by means of supporting empirical evidence in the next section, show
that both ex ante and ex post inefficiencies are needed to fully rationalize our results.
We therefore highlight the importance of a modelling approach to the multinational firm
that incorporates both PRT and TCE type forces.
3.1 Baseline Model
3.1.1 Technology
A downstream firm produces a final good of quality y for which it requires a discrete
number N ≥ 2 of upstream inputs. With a slight abuse of notation, we use N to address
both the number and the finite set of inputs. The production technology is
y =
N
∑
n
m(n)δ(n),
N
∑
n
δ(n) = 1, δ(n) ∈ (0, 1) ∀n ∈ N
where m(n) > 0 denotes the quality of input n. All inputs are always delivered with
quantity one, but their productive contribution depends on their quality.47 Moreover,
46Note that while we model TCE type forces in a way consistent with a wide range of TCE approaches,
inevitably we are unable to capture the vast breadth of ideas in this literature (e.g., the ideas in Klein et al.
(1978)).
47Our technology is therefore Leontief in quantities and shows substitutability in quality. Alternatively,
m(n) can be interpreted as quantity, where contractual problems in a supply relationship arise, for ex-
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inputs may have different elasticities with respect to final output (δ).48 It is this parameter
δ that corresponds to the cost shares in our empirical section and it is what we refer to as
technological significance or importance.49 We assume that inputs are ordered in such
a way that a higher index refers to more important inputs: δ(n) : N 7→ [0, 1] is strictly
increasing. Note that all inputs matter for production and that we assume decreasing
returns to scale for any given input. Moreover, the production function is fully additive,
so that there are no technical complementarities between inputs.
The suppliers can invest into quality and their costs of producing a unit of input n
with quality m(n) is cM < 1, so that production upstream is subject to constant returns
to quality investments.50
3.1.2 Consumer Preferences and the Downstream Market
To simplify matters, the downstream good producer takes the price of its output as
given. Two implications follow: first, revenues are proportional to output and we can
normalize the price of the final output good py ≡ 1. Secondly, we have shut down
interactions between inputs arising from the demand side.
3.1.3 Further Assumptions, Contracting and Timing
There is a continuum of homogeneous suppliers that can potentially produce any given
input n, but none of them can produce more than one variety. Contracts are – for now –
fully incomplete in the sense that only property rights can be contractually specified and
enforced at any point in the game. Crucially, quality investments and other decisions
are non-contractible. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Contract written that includes arrangements regarding ownership
2. Supplier invests in quality
3. Output sold and revenues split in bilateral bargaining subject to haggling
ample, from deviations from specifications that require adaptation or repair. Our predictions would be
identical.
48We could generalize this production function to include heterogeneous weights in the basket of inputs.
What matters, however, for the make-or-buy decision is elasticity of output with respect to inputs (see
Grossman and Hart, 1986). Consequently, we omit these weights from the outset to avoid confusion.
49Note that in a perfectly competitive model without frictions δ(n) equals the cost shares conditional on
input price. In our setting, there will be a positive association of δ(n) and cost shares in equilibrium.
50We assume that cM is sufficiently small so that the surplus from a relationship grows in δ.
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In the context of our game we follow the convention that actions, contractual incomplete-
ness, and inefficiencies in stage 1 and 2 are referred to as “ex ante”, and in stage 3 as “ex
post”. While there is no random shock, this nomenclature supports our exposition.
Similar to Antras and Chor (2013), we do not specify the details of the bargaining
game in stage 3 to simplify the model and allow for closed form solutions. We assume
that property rights over the inputs convey an advantage in outside options – whoever
has ownership can sell the input outside of the relationship at a discount, which is
tantamount to a better disagreement point and more bargaining power. The share of
the surplus appropriated by the downstream firm thus increases in the (endogenous)
ownership share it holds in the inputs, β ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, we assume that the supplier engages in actions that are designed to in-
crease its bargaining share, which we refer to as ”haggling” and which cannot be avoided
due to fully incomplete contracts ex post. The original exposition of these activities by
Williamson (1985) viewed them as pure opportunism, where firms try to tilt the balance
in their favor by wasteful effort; the most obvious examples are perhaps suppliers spend-
ing excessive time on price negotiations or over-staffing their factories under cost plus
contracting. Alternatively, the downstream firm may have to take costly precautions in
the form of inventories or the development of alternative sources for an input (Klein
et al., 1978). Since then, other researchers have examined further mechanisms that rely
on contracting problems ex post, like adaptation (Forbes and Lederman, 2009) or coor-
dination (Hart and Holmstrom, 2010). Here, inefficiencies arise because upstream and
downstream parties have to take ex post actions in response to unforeseen shocks that
have to be aligned in some way. To the extent that they are not, a productive inefficiency
emerges, which is typically disruptive for the buyer’s supply chain. What is common
to all these frameworks is that ownership by one party fully erases such inefficiencies at
the cost of some “governance cost”, which remains largely unspecified.
We capture these TCE mechanisms in a reduced form way by assuming that the part
of the total surplus from the relationship that accrues to the downstream firm in stage 3
is diminished by a factor βγ with γ > 1. While the upstream supplier may face a private
cost for haggling in reality, it is immaterial in our setting (the downstream firm allocates
property rights unilaterally). A higher ownership share reduces the ex post inefficiency
– until haggling is eliminated with β = 1 – in line with the assumption in Hart and
Holmstrom (2010) that ownership can confer residual decision rights. The TCE channel
increases in strength with γ, and is shut down with γ = 0. We furthermore assume
that γ is a function of δ, where ∂γ/∂δ > 0. Intuitively, we acknowledge that failure to
make aligned decisions with more important suppliers will cause a greater inefficiency
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or that haggling by crucial upstream suppliers will cause greater disruption. Finally,
we refrain from modelling an atheoretical “bureaucracy” cost. As will be explicit below,
even without those we have a well defined trade-off between vertical integration and
outsourcing.51, 52, 53
3.1.4 Solution
We solve the game via backward induction and focus on a single input n (we drop the
input indexation from now on to improve the exposition). The surplus generated by
adding an input n of quality m to the final product is equal to mδ, of which the supplier
gets a share 1− β. Consequently, supplier n has to solve
maxm (1− β)mδ − cMm,
which leads it to optimally invest (∗ denotes optimal choices)
m∗ =
(
(1− β)δ
cM
) 1
1−δ
. (2)
This result illustrates the typical insight gained when contracts are incomplete ex ante
and can therefore not support a first best solution. Since the supplier only obtains a
fraction (1− β) of the surplus, and the investment is sunk in stage 3, she will choose
to underinvest ex ante. This investment distortion caused by downstream ownership
is stronger when δ is large: an important supplier has a larger absolute loss in its
marginal investment benefit from downstream ownership and hence limits investment
more severely. More important inputs in terms of δ also receive more investment in
quality ceteris paribus as the marginal return on these is higher.
The downstream firm in the first stage chooses β to maximize its total profits, which
include the ex post inefficiency as a proportional cost. A simple way to derive predic-
tions regarding β is to consider what Antras and Chor (2013) call the “unconstrained
51We can assume a separate cost of vertical integration in the spirit of TCE, but our results are the same,
and unnecessarily more complicated, as long as this cost’s elasticity to ownership is less sensitive to δ than
γ(δ).
52A comment regarding ex ante transfers – for example due to ex ante market power of the downstream
firm and ensuing take-it-or-leave-it offers – is in order. Allowing for these implies that the downstream
firm maximizes the joint ex ante surplus of the relationship by picking β. Since it can appropriate all profits
through the transfer, there is no incentive to increase its ownership and hence all inputs are outsourced.
Clearly, there is no heterogeneity across inputs. This result relies, however, on our assumption that there
are no relationship-specific investments to be made downstream. We do not incorporate ex ante transfers
here to keep the baseline model as simple as possible.
53In our model, we interpret all products as intermediate inputs. Accordingly, we have checked that our
baseline result is fully robust to restricting the sample to intermediates.
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problem”, i.e. choosing the value of β freely from IR. The total surplus that accrues to
the downstream firm is
(
δ
cM
) δ
1−δ
β︸︷︷︸
PRT benefit
βγ︸︷︷︸
TCE benefit
(1− β) δ1−δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
PRT cost
. (3)
The surplus illustrates the main trade-off that shapes the downstream firm’s owner-
ship decision. First, a higher β will directly increase the slice of the total pie it obtains,
which we call the “PRT benefit” of ownership. Secondly, higher ownership directly in-
creases the pie through curbing the ex post inefficiency (less haggling). We refer to this
aspect as the “TCE benefit” of ownership.54 The final term in (3) captures the costs
of downstream ownership, namely that ex ante investments are distorted under fully
incomplete contracts. We call this part “PRT cost” in the spirit of the property rights
literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
The optimal choice of β is
β∗ = (1+ γ)(1− δ)
δ+ (1+ γ)(1− δ) . (4)
The solution rests on a balance of PRT (ex ante) and TCE (ex post) forces. Setting γ = 0
shuts down all ex post inefficiencies and allows us to focus on the predictions from a
pure PRT model. The PRT force pushes for more important inputs to be outsourced as
∂β∗/∂δ|γ=0 = −1 < 0. The downstream firm chooses β = 0 in order to give maximal
investment incentives to the supplier. For γ > 0, however, the overall effect of technolog-
ical importance on ownership is the result of the PRT force and the TCE force combined.
The latter pushes for vertical integration, since control over the upstream firm limits
haggling and coordination losses. Taking all these insights together, we can derive the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 More important inputs are more likely to be integrated iff
ε1+γ,δ >
1
1− δ ,
where εk,l is the elasticity of k with respect to l.
Proof. The derivative
54In line with the key prediction of TCE – that the costs of outsourcing increase in the total appropriable
quasi-rents – the TCE benefit is larger whenever the surplus of the relationship is bigger (see, for example,
Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten, 1984; Joskow, 1985).
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∂β∗
∂δ
=
[δ+ (1+ γ)(1− δ)]∆− (1+ γ)(1− δ)(1+ ∆)
[δ+ (1+ γ)(1− δ))]2
with
∆ ≡ γ′(1− δ)− (1+ γ).
This expression is stricly positive iff
γ′δ
1+ γ
>
1
1− δ .
Intuitively, if the TCE force (embodied in ε1+γ,δ) is relatively strong in the elasticity
sense, it can overpower the PRT force (embodied in 1/(1− δ) above) and lead to a result
consistent with our main finding.
One final comment is in order. As discussed, if we shut down the TCE force, the
highly stylized PRT framework we are left with unambiguously predicts that more im-
portant inputs will be less likely to be vertically integrated — inconsistent with our
empirical findings. While arguably most PRT frameworks in the literature would also
have this feature, it is possible to make assumptions that create the opposite prediction.
In particular, Nowak et al. (2016) show that, depending on relative parameter values,
technological and demand side interactions between inputs that are combined in CES
fashion can make integration of more important inputs optimal. Second, if the down-
stream firm’s outside option (not explicitly modelled in our framework) under outsourc-
ing becomes increasingly bad as we move to more important suppliers, it is possible that,
at some point, the balance tilts towards vertical integration.55 Finally, the marginal in-
vestment costs could be assumed to depend positively on δ (see Acemoglu et al., 2010).
These assumptions are either very difficult to test empirically or seem unlikely to hold
except in special cases, or both. Since TCE type theories of the firm enjoy substantial
empirical support, in our view it is more promising to view the world as being shaped
by both ex ante and ex post forces.
3.2 Extensions
A simpler alternative to incomplete contracting both ex ante and ex post – and with
the same implication regarding vertical integration and cost shares – is of course a pure
TCE framework. In the following two subsections we extend our baseline model in two
55Kohler and Smolka (2018) also construct a PRT framework with multiple suppliers and show that
more productive firms integrate a larger share of their suppliers – but they do not show which ones.
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different ways that give us insights about the conditions under which the PRT force may
be stronger or weaker relative to the TCE force. We test the predictions derived from
these extensions empirically in the subsequent section and thus examine whether PRT
forces are in fact needed to understand our main finding – as a large body of literature
on multinationals would suggest.
3.2.1 Contracting Environment
We first explore how the effect of technological significance depends on ex ante con-
tractibility. We analyze our baseline model, but introduce the following generalizations.
Suppliers no longer choose a single investment under fully incomplete contracts ex ante,
but make a continuum of investment choices xn(j), j ∈ [0, 1], which translate into quality
through m(n) = exp[
∫ 1
0 ln xn(j)dj]. We assume that all investments j < µ with µ ∈ [0, 1]
are fully contractible and are chosen by the downstream firm after ownership has been
allocated, but before the supplier has made her investment choices (Acemoglu et al.,
2007). All investments with j ≥ µ are fully non-contractible ex ante and the costs of
investing are cMxn(j).
In sum, µ serves as a parameter that indicates the quality of contracting institutions
or the inverse of contract intensity ex ante: If µ = 1 all contracts are fully complete and
enforceable ex ante, while with µ = 0 we are back in the case of the baseline model, i.e.
with fully incomplete contracts ex ante. Our comparative static of interest will be about
this parameter.
The solution of the model proceeds as before and is relegated to the theory Appendix
B.2.1. The optimal solution for the ownership share is now
β∗ = (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− µ)]
δ(1− µ) + (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− µ)] , (5)
and we can, once again, show under what condition we obtain a prediction consistent
with our main empirical result.
Lemma 2 More important inputs are more likely to be integrated iff
ε1+γ,δ >
1
1− δ(1− µ) .
56
Proof. The derivative
56It is easy to verify that there always exists an a > 0 such that ∀δ ∈ (0, 1) this expression is satisfied
with γ(δ) = exp(a/(1− δ))− 1.
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∂β∗
∂δ
= (1− µ) δγ
′[1− δ(1− µ)]− (1+ γ)
{δ(1− µ) + (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− µ)]}2 > 0 (6)
iff
δγ′
1+ γ
>
1
1− δ(1− µ) .
We are now in a position to state the main prediction about how a better contracting
environment ex ante affects our baseline result.
Prediction 1 A better contracting environment ex ante leads to a stronger relationship between
the importance of an input and the probability that it is integrated.
The proof for this prediction is relegated to the Theory appendix B.2.2, but the in-
tuition is the following. Making ex ante investments more contractible reduces the in-
centive for the downstream firm to outsource more important inputs (relative to less im-
portant ones): Assuming control over a supplier is now less costly in general, as many
sub-investments are contractually fixed and there is less underinvestment overall. Since
underinvestment is always particularly problematic for more important inputs, these be-
come even more likely to be integrated. In other words, the PRT force that pushes for
outsourcing becomes weaker, while the TCE force remains strong.
3.2.2 Headquarters intensity
For our second prediction, we return to our baseline model, but assume that the down-
stream firm has to make a complementary investment h(n) into every input’s quality.
These investments can be interpreted as effort to adapt an input to the overall product
or how diligently and carefully an input is processed during production. Consequently,
the new production function in terms of quality is
y =
N
∑
n
(
h(n)ηm(n)1−η
)δ
, (7)
where η is our parameter of interest. It captures the relative importance of the two
investments and is commonly referred to as headquarters intensity.57 For η = 0 we are
back in our baseline setting. All other baseline assumptions remain intact and we omit
the input indexation.
57Since it is the downstream firm that undertakes a backwards vertical integration decision in our
setting, it is called “headquarters”.
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The solution of the model is again relegated to Theory appendix B.2.3 for expositional
brevity. The optimal ownership share of the downstream firm is now
β∗ = (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− η)]
δ(1− η) + (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− η)] . (8)
Lemma 3 once again shows that if the TCE force is stronger than the PRT force, the
model with headquarters intensity predicts a relationship between technological impor-
tance and integration that is consistent with our main empirical result.
Lemma 3 More important inputs are more likely to be integrated iff
ε1+γ,δ >
1
1− δ(1− η) .
Proof. The derivative
∂β∗
∂δ
= (1− η) δγ
′[1− δ(1− η)]− (1+ γ)
{δ(1− η) + (1+ γ)[1− δ(1− η)]}2 > 0
iff
δγ′
1+ γ
>
1
1− δ(1− η) .
Prediction 2 Higher headquarters intensity leads to a stronger relationship between the impor-
tance of an input and the probability that it is integrated.
The proof for this prediction is fully analogous to the proof for prediction 1 in the
Theory appendix B.2.2. If the downstream firm has an important investment to make,
the underinvestment costs of vertical integration that pushed for outsourcing of techno-
logically more important inputs (relative to less important ones) in the baseline model
are lower. After all, the downstream firm can both substitute for the supplier’s invest-
ment with its own contribution and encourage it through the complementarity implied
by Cobb-Douglas technology in (7). As a consequence, the incentives to give ownership
to the supplier are reduced and this effect is stronger for more important inputs, which
become relatively more likely to be ‘made’ as opposed to ‘bought’.
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4 Testing further Empirical Predictions
In this section we implement empirical tests of the two theoretical predictions we derived
in the previous part and examine the roles of contracting environment and headquarters
intensity in turn. We first briefly outline and discuss the empirical strategy. Then we
introduce the additional data sources required for the exercise and finally present our
results.
4.1 Contracting Environment
Empirical Specification
To test prediction 1, we interact our main variable of interest, costshare, with proxies
for contractibility, i.e., the ease with which contracts can be written and enforced. The
structural equation for this exercise is
intrashareijpc = β1 costshareip + β2 costshareip × 1(contractibility)
+ αi + γcj + φcp + εijpc. (9)
We have deliberately omitted the index for our contractibility variable in order to high-
light that we employ different empirical measures – to be introduced in the next sub-
section – that vary along various dimensions. Our fixed effects will, however, always
absorb its level effect. The interacted indicator variables take the value one whenever
a characteristic is above the median of its relevant distribution – for example, if a firm
characteristic is above the within 4 digit NAF industry median.
We employ the same identification strategy as for the baseline results in column (3) of
Table 2. In addition, we instrument the interaction term with our instrument interacted
with the measure for contractibility. In line with Prediction 1, we expect that the sign of
our estimates of β2 will be positive.
Data
For the contracting environment, we first make use of three country level variables,
namely the index for property rights protection from V-Dem, a rule of law index from
the World Governance Indicators, and an intellectual property rights protection index
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from Park (2008).58
We furthermore take inspiration from Nunn (2007) and compute several different
contractibility measures that rely on product differentiation. First, we concord the lib-
eral Rauch index to our HS 4 digit products (using French import values in 1996 as
weights) and generate an indicator that equals one whenever a product is not traded on
an exchange or reference priced in trade journals. This is our first variable. Secondly, we
create a Nunn type contractibility measure at the buyer firm level by calculating the 1996
import value weighted share of homogeneous inputs in total products sourced, which is
the second variable we employ. Finally, we calculate the same measures for the down-
stream industries of our buyer firms to obtain the third variable. We also concord the
routineness measure developed by Costinot et al. (2011) to our upstream industries k.59
Results
Our results are reported in Table 5. Each column from (1) to (7) introduces a sep-
arate interaction variable. Except for the Rauch indicator and firm level contractibility,
all variables are significantly positive and very precisely estimated. Overall, we inter-
pret these results as rich evidence in support of Prediction 1, because our measures of
contractibility capture several different aspects of the contracting environment in which
international trade takes place.
Robustness
Larger, more productive firms tend to be different from their less well performing
peers along many dimensions, which is documented by a large literature. It is there-
fore possible that we mistake mere scale effects – larger firms can afford to establish
subsidiaries abroad – for our mechanisms of interest. To address this issue, we control
for (and instrument) interactions of cost shares with firm size (log employment) and
productivity (value added per worker) measures. The results are reported in appendix
Table B.3 and show that the patterns we find are fully robust to this concern.
58The country indicator variables are equal to one if a country is among the top 25 in the world.
59We cannot rule out the possibility that the proxies we use may also partially capture ex post con-
tractibility. In Appendix B.2.4 we show that higher ex post contractibility would typically work in the
opposite direction of prediction 1, i.e. weaken the effect of technological importance. If we do find a pos-
itive interaction effect in our exercise here, it is therefore (even stronger) evidence in favor of PRT forces
being operative.
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4.2 Headquarters Intensity
Empirical Specification
For testing our prediction 2 regarding headquarters intensity, we estimate equation
intrashareijpc = β1 costshareip + β2 costshareip × 1(hqintensity)downj
+ αi + γcj + φcp + εijpc. (10)
We measure importance of investment at the downstream industry j level and instru-
ment all level and interaction terms. As in the previous exercise, we use dummy vari-
ables that indicate when headquarters intensity is larger than the median. According to
our theoretical predictions our estimates of β2 are expected to have a positive sign.
Data
As is common in the literature, we proxy headquarters intensity alternatively by
physical or intangible capital intensity, skill intensity, or service intensity at the down-
stream firm using the EAE as our data source. Service intensity hereby refers to the share
of service sector employees in total employment of a firm.60 Finally, we make use of the
RnD intensity variable constructed by Nunn and Trefler (2013) for the whole world.
Results
Results are reported in Table 6. All estimates for the headquarters intensity interac-
tions are positive. We obtain highly significant results for capital intensity, which is very
much in line with the findings in Antras (2003). Skill intensity as a proxy for the provi-
sion of key conceptual input into the relationship exhibits a similarly significant pattern.
In contrast with Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Nunn and Trefler (2013) we do not find a
significant impact of RnD intensity, which may stem from the fact that there is consid-
erable measurement error in this variable due to classification crosswalks. Overall, we
interpret these findings as evidence in favour of our second prediction.
Robustness
Addressing the same concerns about scale effects as above – larger, more productive
firms are more capital intensitive etc. than their smaller counterparts – we control for
60All variables are described in Appendix B.1.1.
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labor productivity and employment interactions. The results are reported in appendix
Table B.4.
Moreover, the exercise for headquarters intensity is complicated by the fact that what
matters for ownership decisions in the theory is the relative importance of the upstream
to the downstream investment (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2010). In our extended model above,
this was captured by the parameters η and 1− η. Empirically, we would not, however,
expect that upstream and downstream importance of the (marginal) investment follow
a one-to-one relationship. In a final robustness exercise we therefore add upstream
investment intensity as a control, i.e., the same interaction variables as before, but for
the 4 digit ISIC Rev. 3 industry that produces the product imported into France. The
results (appendix Table B.5) are fully robust to this check.61
5 Conclusion
Technological importance of an input – in the sense of a cost share – is a major deter-
minant of the make-or-buy decision: Important inputs are significantly more likely to
be produced in-house. We use detailed trade and firm level data from France to doc-
ument this fact and show that it is robust and economically significant. Through the
lens of a stylized model with incomplete contracting between a buyer and its suppli-
ers, we interpret this finding as the combination of two effects. In general, firms want
to outsource production of their most important inputs to encourage their suppliers’ in-
vestments into the quality of an input. However, trading high cost share intermediates at
arm’s length potentially leads to expensive adaptation/coordination failures and oppor-
tunistic behavior on the part of the upstream partner, so that vertical integration may be
favored. Our baseline estimates are consistent with a world in which the latter, TCE type
incentives dominate. We provide additional empirical evidence for this interpretation of
our estimates. Consistent with predictions from an extended version of our model, the
positive relationship between technological importance and the likelihood of in-house
sourcing is stronger if a) contracts are more complete and b) the downstream firm also
has an important relationship-specific investment to make.
Our work highlights two promising avenues for further research on multinational
firms. First, we believe that the characteristics of supply networks and of the respective
61Interestingly, upstream investment intensity carries a negative sign almost throughout, which is fully
consistent with our theoretical model.
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markets have a substantial bearing on how firms organize production. There already
exist a few important contributions in this area (e.g., Antras and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al.,
forthcoming), but more work is needed to provide the theoretical and empirical evidence
sought-after by policy makers and academics alike (e.g., Bresnahan and Levin, 2012). The
results in this article make progress on this frontier. Secondly, with a few exceptions,
trade economists view multinational activity as shaped by the risk of underinvestment
in the spirit of the property rights theory of the firm. While this paradigm delivers
explanations for a variety of empirical patterns, its pervasiveness may also lead to a more
narrow research agenda. Our results, which complement other work such as Costinot
et al. (2011), provide further encouragement to view the international trade landscape
through a wider range of conceptual lenses, including transaction cost economics.
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Appendices
A Figures and tables for the main text
Figure 1: Contour Plots of Various IO Tables
In reading pattern starting with upper left: Official 2 digit domestic, 2 digit self-constructed, 4 digit
symmetric self-constructed, 4 digit asymmetric self-constructed.
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Figure 2: Empirical Density of Direct Requirements (Asymmetric French IO Table in
1996)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean median sd count
Average Intrafirm Trade Share 0.27 0.09 0.34 3157
Average Number of Products 10 7 12 3157
Employment 467 198 1,186 3107
Sales 160.1k 38.8k 1,136.7k 3155
Capital Intensity 900 446 7100 3103
Intangible Cap. Int. 106 18 1021 2971
Skill Intensity 185 172 71 3103
TFP Wooldridge (ln) 1.53 1.24 1.16 3003
VA per worker 1,261 650 7,780 3096
Summary statistics are computed at the firm level and refer to imports only. The
average intrafirm trade share is the across firm level average of the within firm av-
erage computed along the input × country dimension. All variables are explained
in Appendix B.1.1.
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Table 2: Baseline Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm
share share share share share
cost share 3.784*** 2.990*** 12.137*** 11.880*** 10.742***
(0.695) (0.399) (1.417) (1.678) (2.230)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES
Observations 76,882 70,001 70,001 70,001 70,001
R-squared 0.017 0.687 0.648 0.650 0.659
Instrument Micro Micro China Official U.S.
1996 2006 2002
excl own firm excl France 4 digit
KP-stat 1st stage 219.3 96.38 89.01
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports
of the firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the firm’s total
expenditure on intermediates. Common sample across columns (2)-(5). Standard errors in parentheses are two-
way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Baseline Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm
share share share share share share
cost share 11.309*** 11.161*** 8.376** 6.151** 12.777*** 12.069***
(2.230) (1.543) (3.993) (2.961) (1.307) (1.435)
× 1(Eff. Appl. Tariff)cp 0.755
(13.082)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES
Ind 4dig FE*HS4 product YES
Up Ind 4dig*Firm YES
Country*Firm YES
Sample drop HHIdownstr full full full full
diagonal < 0.1
Observations 55,211 42,802 71,999 68,825 66,362 75,508
R-squared 0.702 0.666 0.740 0.826 0.766 0.648
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 107.1 120.7 21.44 40.39 260.4 122
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports of the
firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the firm’s total expenditure
on intermediates. The Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index HHIdownstr is computed within NAF 4 digit industries, using
the population of French firms’ sales. Number of observations varies due to different sets of singletons (dropped)
and availability of tariffs. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev.
3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Horse Race with Integration Determinants at Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm
share share share share share share share
cost share 0.820*** 0.827*** 0.826*** 0.791*** 0.807*** 0.845*** 0.822***
(0.463) (0.461) (0.461) (0.448) (0.452) (0.461) (0.446)
log capital intensity 0.064*** 0.035**
(0.005) (0.008)
log intangible cap. Int. 0.061*** 0.031*
(0.003) (0.003)
log skill intensity 0.106** 0.104***
(0.055) (0.039)
log VA per worker 0.106***
(0.008)
log TFP 0.138*** 0.128***
(0.009) (0.010)
IM ratio 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.173*** 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.175*** 0.162***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 258,792 258,792 258,792 258,792 258,792 258,792 258,792
R-squared 0.105 0.101 0.103 0.130 0.120 0.090 0.114
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 124.6 124.3 120.8 124.6 125.6 125.1 120.4
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports of the firm for
that input × country pair. The main regressors are the firm × input level cost share in total expenditure on intermediates
(instrumented) and the IM ratios from a Heckman first stage non-response adjustment (for details, see Appendix B.1.2). Details
on how the other variables are constructed can be found in Appendix B.1.1. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped
and two-way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Contracting Environment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CONTRACTIBILITY PR Protect. Rule of Law IPR Protect. Contractibility Contractibility Contractibility Upstr.
PROXY Product Firms Industry Routineness
cost share 10.187*** 9.709*** 2.929 12.456*** 11.890*** 10.040*** 8.924***
(1.631) (1.811) (2.342) (1.386) (1.292) (1.820) (2.222)
× 1(proxy) 3.901*** 3.286** 9.748*** 0.271 1.281 6.242** 5.359**
(1.065) (1.510) (2.417) (2.404) (1.422) (2.365) (2.441)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283
R-squared 0.644 0.646 0.648 0.645 0.644 0.637 0.642
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 102.2 82.34 23.12 43.21 104.7 63.73 75.08
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports of the firm for that input × country pair. The
regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the firm’s total expenditure on intermediates. The interaction variables are described in Appendix B.1.1 and we
interact with dummies that equal one if a variable is above the median across the relevant distribution or if a country belongs to the top 25 origins according to
an index. Common sample imposed across all columns. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry
and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Headquarters Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HQ Intensity Proxy RnD Capital Intangible Cap. Skill Service
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
cost share 11.542*** 8.941*** 11.229*** 9.394*** 12.029***
(2.007) (1.347) (1.558) (1.533) (1.942)
× 1( proxy) 1.507 7.163*** 2.679 5.280** 0.847
(2.383) (2.012) (2.405) (2.515) (2.935)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,303 72,303 72,303 72,303 72,303
R-squared 0.643 0.634 0.644 0.637 0.644
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 65.77 65.93 71.91 60.14 91.65
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall
imports of the firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the
firm’s total expenditure on intermediates. The interaction variables are described in appendix B.1.1 and
we interact with dummies that equal one if a variable is above the median across the relevant distribution.
Common sample imposed across all columns. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Data
In this appendix we first describe how we construct our variables. In the second part, we
give a detailed account of our replication of the Heckman correction procedure following
Corcos et al. (2013).
B.1.1 Variables
In this section we provide the details on how we construct our variables for the empirical
analysis.
• totcost: Total intermediate costs are computed from EAE and defined as the sum of
purchases of goods (R210), purchases of raw materials (R212), and other purchases
and charges (R214). In a robustness check we add total labor costs (R216), social
contributions (R217), and other charges (R222).
• Gross Output: It is computed from FICUS and defined as the sum of turnover
(CATOTAL), change in inventories (PRODIMM, PRODSTO), and other revenues
(AUTPREX).
• Capital Intensity: The ratio of the physical capital stock to total employment, where
the capital stock is measured as the total of tangible capital assets at end of year
(EAE item I150) and total employment is the total number of full time equivalent
employees (EAE item E101).
• Intangible Capital Intensity: Same as capital intensity, but uses only the total stock
of intangible capital assets at end of year (EAE item I456).
• Skill Intensity: Is defined as average wage, i.e., the ratio of total wage expenses to
the employment of the firms, as in Corcos et al. (2013).
• TFP: It is computed using the revised Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology
proposed by Wooldridge (2009). The coefficient of a Cobb-Douglas value-added
production function are estimated at the 3 digit NACE industry level using in-
termediate inputs as the proxy for the productivity shock. Real value added is
obtained by double-deflation using deflators for output and intermediates from
the OECD STAN database. Output is defined as the sum of turnover (R310) and
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other sales (R315), while intermediate costs are defined as above. Capital is de-
fined as above and deflated using a deflator for gross fixed capital formation. All
variables are logged. TFP at the firm level is then calculated as a residual between
the actual and predicted value added using the estimated coefficients.
• Scale: average number of employees over the year (EAE item E101).
• Value added per employee: It is computed from EAE, with value added defined as
the difference between turnover (R310) and the sum of purchases of goods (R210)
and purchases of raw materials (R212).
• Firm level contract intensity: the variable is constructed using information about
firms imports. The firm-level contract intensity is an import value weighted aver-
age of the contract intensity of its inputs, where the measure of contract intensity is
a dummy equal to one if an input is (liberally) classified as differentiated in Rauch
(1999). It is therefore similar to the measure used in in Nunn (2007) and Corcos et
al. (2013), except that we weight by import value.
• Industry level contract intensity: same as firm level contract intensity, but weight-
ing by total downstream industry (NAF) imports.
• Service intensity: ratio of workers employed in branches that produce services
(NACE codes from 50 to 93) to total employment.
• Property Rights Protection: We use the V-Dem indicator “v2xcl prpty”, which
codes the property rights index. The description reads: “Private property includes
the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Lim-
its on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail
to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This
question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.”
The scale is ordinal, but converted to the unit interval. See Coppedge et al. (2018)
and Pemstein et al. (2018).
• Rule of Law: We use the Rule of Law index for 1998 provided in the World Gover-
nance Indicators, see Kaufmann et al. (2011).
• IPR Protection: We use the IPR protection index provided by Park (2008).
• Routine Task Intensity: We concord the indices (average routineness content of
tasks) provided in Costinot et al. (2011) to our NAF industry classification.
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• Relationship-specificity: We use the classification in Rauch (1999) and recode ev-
ery HS 4 input to ”relationship-specific” if it is differentiated, while it is ”not
relationship-specific” if it is traded on exchanges or reference priced (aggregation
to HS 4 digit is done by weighting with 1996 import values). Therefore, our variable
is a simple indicator at the product level.
B.1.2 Selection Adjustment for Horse Race
As discussed in Corcos et al. (2013), the EIIG survey suffered from significant non-
response, which the authors addressed with a Heckman control function approach. All
our results with firm fixed effects are fully robust to these concerns due to the fact that
we use only within firm variation. Our quantitative explorations in the cross section
are liable to sample selection bias, however. Consequently, we implement the two step
procedure suggested by Corcos et al. (2013). We are grateful to these authors for giving
us access to the target population of EIIG.
In a first step we add the 3,841 firms in the EIIG target population that did not
respond to the survey, giving us a total of 4, 305 + 3, 841 = 8, 146 firm observations in
the target population.62 In line with the focus of our paper as well as of Corcos et
al. (2013), we focus on the 5,333 firms that operate mainly in manufacturing. Using
the universe of customs data for these firms, we are able to compute three excluded
selection variables as in Corcos et al. (2013). In particular, the selection stage of our two
step Heckman procedure is
1(responded)i = α+ β1 log(importvaluei)
+ β2 log(# products) + β3 log(# countries) + γk + ηi, (B.1)
where we regress a dummy for whether or not a firm responded to the survey on its total
import value, the number of imported HS 4 digit products, and the number of origin
countries for these flows in 1999. γk denotes a set of indicators for the firms’ three digit
ISIC Rev. 3 industry codes in the output market. Having estimated (B.1), we predict
inverse Mill’s (IM) ratios for our firms.
Again following Corcos et al. (2013) as closely as possible, we extend the EIIG sample
with a random sample of non-multinational manufacturing firms who are present in the
EAE and who traded more than one million EUR in the previous year (large traders).
62Our numbers deviate slightly from those reported in Corcos et al. (2013), since various versions of the
EIIG data were published over time.
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To do so, we first obtain the full EAE sample of large trader manufacturers by means of
the universe of customs data and subtract the EIIG firms. Then we draw a 52.85 percent
random sample and add it to the EIIG firms. To run our second stage regressions, we add
all necessary international trade and firm level information for this composit sample.63
In the random sample of non-multinational manufacturers we set the IM ratios equal
to zero and assume that all their imported inputs come from third parties – just as in
Corcos et al. (2013). We bootstrap all standard errors, clustering two-way at the 3 digit
up- and downstream industry level as throughout the paper.
63This is equivalent to what Corcos et al. (2013) call their ‘large sample’, but at the level of HS 4 digit,
rather than CPA.
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B.2 Theory
B.2.1 Solution for the model with partially incomplete contracting ex ante
The surplus created by the relationship can now be written as
{
exp
[∫ 1
0
ln xn(j)dj
]}δ
of which the supplier obtains a share (1− β) on the third stage. It hence chooses its
non-contractible investments xncn (k) on stage 2 to maximize its profits minus the costs∫ 1
µ cMx
nc
n (j)dj. The optimal choice is
xnc,∗n (j) = xnc,∗n =
(1− β)δ
cM
(mcn)
δ(mnc,∗n )δ, (B.2)
where mc denotes
exp
[∫ µ
0
ln xcn(j)dj
]
,
i.e. the composite of all contractible investments. Note that non-contractible investments
are fully symmetric, so that we can compute the index of non-contractible investments
as
mnc,∗n =
(
(1− β)δ
cM
) 1−µ
1−δ(1−µ)
(mc)
δ(1−µ)
1−δ(1−µ) . (B.3)
The downstream firm now chooses the levels of the contractible investments in order
to maximize its profit from the relationship. The reader should keep in mind that the
TCE costs fall exclusively on the downstream firm. Therefore, the profits are
ββγ(mc)δ(m∗,nc)δ −
∫ µ
0
cMxcn(j)dj,
where we assume that the supplier can recuperate the investment costs fully in its con-
tract with the downstream firm – it therefore does not matter, who pays the investment
costs.
Optimal contractible investments are
xc,∗n = ββγ(1− β)
δ(1−µ)
1−δ(1−µ)
(
δ
cM
) 1
1−δ(1−µ) 1
1− δ(1− µ) (m
c,∗
n )
δ
1−δ(1−µ) . (B.4)
Again, we note that all contractible investments are symmetric. Therefore the expres-
sion for the index of contractible investments is
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mc,∗n = β
µ[1−δ(1−µ)]
1−δ βγ
µ[1−δ(1−µ)]
1−δ (1− β) µδ(1−µ)1−δ
(
δ
cM
) µ
1−δ
[1− δ(1− µ)]− µ[1−δ(1−µ)]1−δ . (B.5)
We can now plug the expressions (B.3) and (B.5) into mc and mnc to obtain the down-
stream firm’s net profits from the relationship
ββγ(mc,∗)δ(mnc,∗)δ =
β
1−δ(1−µ)
1−δ βγ
1−δ(1−µ)
1−δ (1− β) δ(1−µ)1−δ
(
δ
cM
) δ
1−δ
[1− δ(1− µ)]− µδ1−δ , (B.6)
which it maximizes by choosing β on the first stage of the game. The first order condition
is
(1+ γ)[1− δ(1− µ)](1− β∗) = δ(1− µ)β∗.
The solution to this first order condition is given in expression (5) in the main text.
B.2.2 Proof of Prediction 1
We want to show that the second order derivative of the optimal ownership share (5) is
strictly positive. First, note that we can rewrite the derivative ∂β∗/∂δ in (6) as
1− µ
{1+ γ[1− δ(1− µ)]2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g(µ)
×{δγ′[1− δ(1− µ)]− (1+ γ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ f (µ)
.
We furthermore defined the two parts of the first order derivative as functions of µ.
Restating the goal of the proof, we want to show that
∂ f (µ)/∂µ
f (µ)
> −∂g(µ)/∂µ
g(µ)
.
We find that
−∂g(µ)/∂µ
g(µ)
=
1+ γ[1+ δ(1− µ)]
1+ γ[1− δ(1− µ)]
and
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∂ f (µ)/∂µ
f (µ)
=
δγ′[1− δ(1− µ)]− (1+ γ)
δγ′
.
After a few algebraic steps one arrives at the inequality
δγ′[2δ(1− µ)− 1]− δγ′γ[1− δ(1− µ)] > −(1+ γ){1+ γ[1+ δ(1− µ)]} (B.7)
Next, we assume that the inequality in Lemma 2, i.e. δγ′[1 − δ(1 − µ)] > 1 + γ is
satisfied. Note that dividing (B.7) by this inequality gives us a sufficient condition for
(∂β∗)2/∂δ∂µ > 0, namely
2δ(1− µ)
1− δ(1− µ) − γ > −{1+ γ[1+ δ(1− µ)]}.
Rearranging this inequality shows that our proof is successful:
1 > γ[1− δ(1− µ)].
B.2.3 Solution for the model with headquarters intensity
The surplus of the relationship can be written as
hδηmδ(1−η).
Therefore, on the second stage, the two firms choose their respective investments to
maximize
(1− β)hδηmδ(1−η) − cMm
in the case of the supplier and
ββγhδηmδ(1−η) − cHh
in the case of the downstream firm. Solving this system of equations we find the optimal
investments, namely
m∗ = (1− β) 1−δη1−δ β(1+γ) δη1−δ
(
δη
cH
) δη
1−δ (δ(1− η)
cM
) 1−δη
1−δ
and
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h∗ = (1− β) δ(1−η)1−δ β(1+γ) 1−δ(1−η)1−δ
(
δη
cH
) 1−δ(1−η)
1−δ (δ(1− η)
cM
) δ(1−η)
1−δ
.
Using these two optimal investment levels, we can compute the downstream firm’s
payoff on stage 1,
(1− β) δ(1−η)1−δ β(1+γ) 1−δ(1−η)1−δ
(
δη
cH
) δη
1−δ (δ(1− η)
cM
) δ(1−η)
1−δ
.
The solution for the optimal ownership share is given by the first order condition
from maximizing the last expression with respect to β.
B.2.4 The model with incomplete contracts ex post
We assume that the ex post inefficiency now depends on µp:
β(1−µ
p)γ,
while ex ante contracts are fully incomplete without loss of generality. With this speci-
fication we assume that the downstream firm can avoid some of the haggling or coordi-
nation/adaptation frictions through enforceable contracts. Clearly, more contractibility
(higher µp) reduces the ex post inefficiency and makes it less sensitive to changes in γ.
The solution of the model proceeds as before in the baseline and imperfect contract-
ing cases. The optimal solution for the ownership share becomes
β∗ = [1+ γ(1− µ
p)](1− δ)
δ+ [1+ γ(1− µp)](1− δ) . (B.8)
We can, once again, show under what condition we obtain a prediction consistent
with our main empirical result.
Lemma 4 More important inputs are more likely to be integrated iff
ε1+γ(1−µp),δ >
1
1− δ .
Proof. The derivative
∂β∗
∂δ
=
δγ′(1− µp)(1− δ)− [1+ γ(1− µp)]
{δ+ [1+ γ(1− µp)](1− δ)}2 > 0 (B.9)
iff
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δγ′(1− µp)
1+ γ(1− µp) >
1
1− δ .
We now show that, in our typical setting, ex post contractibility weakens the effect of
technological importance on vertical integration. First, rewrite
∂β∗
∂δ
=
(1− µp)[δγ′(1− δ)− γ]− 1]
[1+ γ(1− µp)(1− δ)]2 .
We want to show that
(∂β∗)2
∂δ∂µp
< 0
or
δγ′[γ(1− δ)(1− µp)− 1] < γ1− 2δ
1− δ . (B.10)
In our data, the cost shares of the vast majority of products is very low as can be
discerned from the summary statistics presented above. Consequently, δ will in general
be quite low and we expect that
γ(1− δ)(1− µp)− 1 < 0,
and
γ
1− 2δ
1− δ > 0
in which case the inequality (B.10) is satisfied.
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B.3 Figures and tables
Figure B.1: Empirical Density of Input Cost Shares
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Table B.1: Baseline Estimates (diagonal dropped)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm intrafirm
share share share share share
cost share 2.604*** 2.510*** 10.877*** 12.625*** 20.650**
(0.700) (0.837) (2.260) (3.115) (8.154)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES
Observations 56,278 50,675 50,675 50,675 50,675
R-squared 0.004 0.718 0.704 0.697 0.649
Instrument Micro Micro China Official US
1996 2006 2002
excl own firm excl France 4 digit
KP-stat 1st stage 121.6 75.72 15.36
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports
of the firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the firm by input level cost share in total expenditure
on intermediates. Common sample imposed across columns (2)-(5). Standard errors in parentheses are two-way
clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.2: Baseline First Stages
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES cost share cost share cost share
Quintile Micro Table FR ’96 0.002***
(0.000)
Quintile Micro Table CN ’06 0.002***
(0.000)
Quintile 4 digit IO table US ’02 0.002***
(0.000)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES
Observations 70,001 70,001 70,001
R-squared 0.648 0.650 0.659
KP-stat 1st stage 219.3 96.38 89.01
The dependent variable is the firm × input level cost share in total expenditure
on intermediates. The 1996 French import IO table was constructed dropping a
firm’s own trade flows. The 2006 Chinese IO table was constructed dropping all
imports from France. Common sample imposed across all columns. Standard errors
in parentheses are two-way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry
and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.3: Contract Environment: Scale and Productivity Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CONTRACTIBILITY PROXY PR Protect. Rule of Law IPR Protect. Contractibility Contractibility Contractibility Upstr.
Product Firms Industry Routineness
cost share 6.113*** 5.911*** -0.869 8.490*** 8.049*** 5.705*** 5.489***
(1.587) (1.557) (3.010) (1.491) (1.367) (1.983) (2.004)
× 1(proxy) 4.031*** 3.193** 9.978*** 0.296 1.040 6.373*** 5.067**
(1.059) (1.550) (2.487) (2.434) (1.477) (2.365) (2.491)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283 72,283
R-squared 0.645 0.647 0.649 0.646 0.645 0.638 0.643
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 40.73 40.22 12.32 21.89 41.27 32.84 48.24
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall imports of the firm for that input × country pair. The
regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the firm’s total expenditure on intermediates. The interaction variables are described in appendix B.1.1, coefficients for
employment and value added per worker are omitted, and we interact with dummies that equal one if a variable is above the median across the relevant distribution
or if a country belongs to the top 25 origins according to an index. Common sample imposed across all columns. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way
clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.4: Headquarters Intensity: Scale and Productivity Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HQ Intensity Proxy RnD Capital Intangible Cap. Skill Service
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
cost share 10.314*** 7.628*** 10.491*** 8.590*** 10.954***
(2.490) (1.330) (1.462) (1.623) (1.988)
× 1( proxy) 1.849 7.674*** 2.416 5.169*** 1.141
(2.523) (1.893) (2.408) (2.488) (2.919)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,147 72,147 72,147 72,147 72,147
R-squared 0.641 0.632 0.642 0.636 0.641
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 28.19 30.12 32.80 27.35 40.90
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall
imports of the firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the input × firm level cost share in
the firm’s total expenditure on intermediates. The interaction variables are described in appendix B.1.1,
coefficients for employment and value added per worker are omitted, and we interact with dummies that
equal one if a variable is above the median across the relevant distribution. Common sample imposed
across all columns. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the 3 digit downstream ISIC
Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.5: Headquarters Intensity: Upstream Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HQ Intensity Proxy RnD Capital Intangible Cap. Skill Service
Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity Intensity
cost share 13.210*** 9.147*** 10.731*** 11.309*** 13.389***
(2.386) (1.421) (1.753) (1.971) (2.258)
× 1(proxy downstr) 2.957 7.353*** 2.366 6.610** 2.772
(2.855) (2.389) (2.318) (2.840) (3.412)
× 1(proxy upstr) -3.706 -0.539 1.325 -4.405 -4.752
(3.568) (2.520) (2.820) (2.952) (3.149)
Country*HS4 product FE YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Ind 4dig FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 72,303 72,303 72,303 72,303 72,303
R-squared 0.644 0.635 0.643 0.641 0.642
Instrument Micro 1996 excl own firm
KP-stat 1st stage 19.94 27.95 30.50 35.79 31.25
The dependent variable is the input × country × firm level share of intrafirm import value in overall
imports of the firm for that input × country pair. The regressor is the input × firm level cost share in the
firm’s total expenditure on intermediates. The interaction variables are described in appendix B.1.1 and
we interact with dummies that equal one if a variable is above the median across the relevant distribution.
Common sample imposed across all columns. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
3 digit downstream ISIC Rev. 3 industry and at the 3 digit upstream ISIC Rev. 3 level. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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